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Michelle Flaherty*

Self-represented Litigants, Active
Adjudication and the Perception of
Bias: Issues in Administrative Law

This paper advocates for a more active role for adjudicators, one in which they
provide direction to parties and actively shape the hearing process. Active
adjudication can be an important access to justice tool. Without some direction
and assistance from the adjudicator, growing numbers of self-represented
litigants cannot meaningfully access administrative justice. Importantly, however,
as the role of the adjudicator shifts, so too must our understanding of the notion
of impartiality If it is unfair to expect self-represented litigants to navigate the
hearing process without adjudicative assistance and direction, it is also unfair to
insist on a vision of impartiality that prevents adjudicators from actively managing
the hearing process. To that end, the author develops the notion of "substantive
impartiality" to show how existing legal principles can accommodate a more
active role for the administrative adjudicator The author also makes practical
recommendations and suggests how administrative tribunals can help selfrepresented litigants understand the principles and procedures related to bias
allegations.

L'auteure soumet que les adjudicateurs doivent jouer un r6le plus actif, ce
qui comprend donner des directives aux parties et intervenir pour donner
forme au processus d'audience. Ladjudication active peut constituer un
important m6canisme d'acces a la justice. Sans directives ni aide de la part de
I'adjudicateur un nombre croissant de parties qui se representent elles-m~mes
ne peuvent avoir un acces raisonnable j la justice administrative. II importe de
souligner cependant que lorsque le r6le de I'adjudicateurchange, notre vision du
concept d'impartialite doit aussi changer II n'est pas juste de sattendre j ce que
des parties qui se repr6sentent elles-m~mes puissent participer au processus
d'audience sans aide ou sans directives, tout comme il n'est pas juste d'insister
sur une vision de I'impartialit6 qui emp6che les arbitres de gerer activement ce
processus. A cette fin, Iauteure 6labore le concept d',, impartialitd substantive ,
(substantive impartiality) pour illustrer comment les principes de droit existants
peuvent accueillir un role plus actif pour I'arbitre administratif. Lauteure formule
6galement des recommandations plus pratiques et propose des fagons pour les
tribunaux administratifs d'aider les litigants qui se repr6sentent eux-m~mes 6
comprendre les procedures et les principes associ6s PI'impartialit6.

* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa.
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Introduction
This piece draws on my own experience as a human rights adjudicator, at
a tribunal in which many parties represent themselves.' As they engage in
litigation, I have noticed that self-represented parties often form their own
views of the appropriate role of adjudicators and whether those adjudicators
are fairly considering the case. At times, the views formulated by selfrepresented litigants fit awkwardly within the existing legal paradigm. The
resulting disparity between how the law defines the role of the adjudicator,
however ambiguously, and how some self-represented litigants view
that role can lead to a host of issues, including fairness concerns, bias
allegations, and hearing management problems.
These issues are particularly important in light of both growing
numbers of self-represented litigants and recent trends towards more
active adjudication. For a number of administrative tribunals, self-

1. Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, "2013-2014 Annual Report," (SJTO, 2015), online: <www.
sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sjto/2013-14%2OAnnual%20Report.pdf?171751>. This statistic refers to
representation at the time of mediation. The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (Tribunal) does not
publish statistics regarding representation at later stages of the proceeding. The Tribunal was revamped
in 2008 and designed with self-represented litigants in mind. Indeed, the Ontario Human Rights Code,
RSO 1990, c H. 19, s 40 [HRC] explicitly provides for "active adjudication" and the Tribunal rules and
adjudicative approach encourage fair, just and expeditious resolution of human rights applications.
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representation is the norm. 2 In the hopes of making administrative justice
more accessible for these litigants, many administrative tribunals have
been reconsidering how they operate, and this can include rethinking the
role of the adjudicator.' In this piece, I argue that active adjudication is an
important tool to promote both fairness and efficiency in administrative
justice. However, as the role of the adjudicator shifts, so too must our
understanding of the notion of impartiality. As the adjudicative model
adjusts to meet the needs of increasing numbers of self-represented
litigants, the legal boundaries that define the adjudicator's role must adjust

commensurately.
In a number of tribunals, the adjudicative model has begun to shift
from a more traditional, 4 passive approach to one in which decision-makers

2. . This has also been the case in some levels of court. See, e.g., Andr& Gallant, "The Tax Court's
Informal Procedure and Self-Represented Litigants: Problems and Solutions" (2005) 53:2 Can Tax
J 333. In Anne-Marie Langan, "Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: Unrepresented
Litigants in the Family Courts of Ontario" (2005) 30:2 Queen's LJ 825 at 826-827, the author cites
data compiled by the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, which show that in 2003, 43.2%
of applicants in the Family Court Division of the Ontario Court of Justice were not represented by
counsel when they first filed with the court. The average percentage of unrepresented litigants in
Ontario family courts between 1998 and 2003 was 46%.
3.
Michelle Flaherty, "Self-Represented Litigants: A Sea Change in Adjudication" in Graham
Mayeda & Peter Oliver, eds, Principles and Pragmatism: Essays in Honour of Louise Charron
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) 323; Cynthia Gray, "Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial
Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants" (2007) 27:1 J National Assoc Administrative L Judiciary 97;
Stephan Landsman, "Pro Se Litigation" (2012) 8 Annual Rev L & Social Science 231; Samantha
Green & Lome Sossin, "Administrative Justice and Innovation: Beyond the Adversarial/inquisitorial
Dichotomy" in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, eds, The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013) 71. There has also
been a growing discussion about the role of judges dealing with self-represented litigants and the
importance of access to justice more generally. See Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 27,
[2014] 1 SCR 87; Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (AG), 2014
SCC 59, [2014] 3 SCR 31; "Courts and the Self-Represented: The Road Ahead," Editorial, (2001)
84:6 Judicature 300; Bonnie Rose Hough & Justice Laurie D Zelon, "Self-Represented Litigants:
Challenges and Opportunities for Access to Justice" (2008) 47:3 Judges' J 30; Marla N Greenstein,
"Judges' Responsibilities to Pro Se Litigants" (2008) 47:3 Judges' J 46; Jona Goldschmidt, "Judicial
Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience" (2008-2009) 17:3
MSU-DCL J Intl L & Prac 601. Gray, supra note 3; National Self-Represented Litigants Project,
Working With Self-Represented Litigants: Ideas and Suggestions From the Bench (Windsor, ON:
University of Windsor, 2014), online: NSRLP <representingyourselfcanada.com>
4.
1refer to the passive style of adjudication in which decision-makers determine outcomes based
on the evidence, as it is presented by the parties or their representatives as the "traditional" model
of adjudication. As approaches to adjudication have varied over time, it is perhaps a misnomer to
refer to any particular adjudicative style as "traditional." However, for the purposes of this piece,
"traditional" refers to the passive model of adjudication in which decision-makers play a passive role
and determine the legal issues based on the evidence presented by the parties or their representatives.
This approach has been the most prominent approach to adjudication in recent times and would
generally be understood by lawyers practicing today as the typical or traditional model of adjudication.
See, e.g., the HRC, supra note 1, s 43(3), which identifies a number of "non-traditional" adjudicative
tools, which contemplate a more directive and active role for adjudicators.
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more actively adjudicate cases and direct the course of the proceedings.5
In many instances, this shift arises out of recognition that, without some
assistance and direction from the adjudicator, many self-represented
parties cannot meaningfully access the justice system.6 However, engaging
in more active and directive styles of adjudication is not without pitfalls.
Adjudicators must walk a very fine line. The jurisprudence tells us that
although we assist parties so that they can access the legal process, we
must not help (or be perceived to help) them too much. Decisions are
overturned both because a decision-maker has failed to provide a sufficient
level of assistance7 and because the decision-maker has provided a level
of assistance that gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.8 The
challenge is to find the sweet spot that lies between enough help to ensure
meaningful access to adjudication but not so much help as to create a
reasonable apprehension of bias. As we shall see in the jurisprudence,
adjudicators sometimes struggle as they apply legal principles to define
their role. Not surprisingly, understanding the role of the adjudicator
presents even more of a challenge for the self-represented litigant, for
whom the applicable principles can seem both legalistic, but also flexible
to the point of arbitrariness.
This paper begins by describing the shift in adjudicative approach
and setting out recent developments that have led adjudicators to play
a more active role in shaping the hearing process and assisting selfrepresented litigants. Next, I consider the challenge of defining the scope
and content of the impartiality obligations in light of these new approaches
to adjudication. Finally, I look at the jurisprudential treatment of bias
applications by self-represented litigants and consider whether any trends
emerge from this jurisprudence, both in terms of what self-represented

5. While the focus of this piece is administrative tribunals, it is worth noting that similar measures
are also being considered and adopted in some courts. For example, judges are also assisting selfrepresented litigants by explaining the rules to them, applying them with more flexibility, and raising
evidentiary and substantive issues: Engler, infra note 23.
6.
Lome Sossin & Jamie Baxter, "Ontario's Administrative Tribunal Clusters: A Glass Half-Full
or Half-Empty for Administrative Justice?" (2012) 12:1 OUCLJ 157; Michael Gottheil & Doug
Ewart, "Improving Access to Justice through Intemational Dialogue: Lessons for and from Ontario's
Cluster Approach to Tribunal Efficiency and Effectiveness" (Paper delivered at the 2010 Australian
Conference of Planning and Environmental Courts and Tribunals) [unpublished], online: ELTO
<www.elto.gov.on.ca>.
7. Kainz v Potter (2006), 33 RFL (6th) 62 (Ont Sup Ct); Audmax Inc v Ontario (Human Rights
Tribunal), 2011 ONSC 35, 328 DLR (4th) 506; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Hylton, 2010 ONCA 752,
270 OAC 98.
8. Limoges v Investors Group FinancialServices. Inc, 2003 ABQB 757, 125 ACWS (3d) 255
[Limoges]; Tran v FinancialDebt Recovery Ltd (2001), 40 CCLT (3d) 106 (Ont Sup Ct) [Tran].
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litigants perceive to be partial treatment by adjudicators and how these
concerns can be addressed.
I.

Active adjudication:Its role in ensuringfair hearingsfor selfrepresentedlitigants
Many administrative tribunals contend with significant numbers of selfrepresented litigants. This reality has influenced much about how those
tribunals were designed and how they operate, including the formulation
of their rules and the development of their administrative and adjudicative
practices. Indeed, as many administrative tribunals have already
recognized, access tojustice issues must be considered from the perspective
of litigants, including those who are self-represented. 9 Their perception
is key because, as Roderick Macdonald put it, "the law requires citizens
to come to it, not the reverse."' 1 Litigants who view the administrative
justice system as unfair or inaccessible may question the legitimacy of the
outcome or may elect not to engage with the justice system at all."
How do self-represented litigants perceive the justice system and
do they feel they can meaningfully access it? Recent empirical research
shows that most self-represented litigants approach legal proceedings with
a great deal of anxiety and trepidation. 2 They perceive themselves to be
disadvantaged by their lack of legal training and feel lost, excluded, and
isolated within the legal process. 3 They are uncomfortable and fear being
the only person in the room without legal training, the only one who does
not grasp procedural steps or legal jargon. The effect can be devastating:
self-represented litigants often feel that the rules prevent them from telling
their story and, as a result, many self-represented litigants exit the justice
system with diminished confidence in its fairness and the legitimacy of its
outcomes. 14
Self-represented litigants are also highly sensitive to fairness issues
and often perceive the justice system, with its rules and formalities, as

9.
Gottheil & Ewart, supra note 6.
10. Roderick A Macdonald, "Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions" in
Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justicefor a New Century: The Way
Forward(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 19 at 27.
11. The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, "The Challenges We Face" (Remarks delivered
at the Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, 8 March 2007) [unpublished], online: SCC <www.scc-csc.
.gc.ca/>.
12. Julie Macfarlane, The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the
Needs of Self-Represented Litigants: FinalReport (2013), Report prepared for the Law Foundation of
Ontario, the Law Foundation of Alberta, and the Law Foundation of British Columbia/Legal Services
Society of British Columbia at 96, online: LSUC <www.lsuc.on.ca>.
13. Ibid.
14. Gray, supranote 3 at 106-107.
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designed to favour represented parties. Self-represented litigants are
concerned about any differential treatment by an adjudicator, even where
that treatment is, at its root, designed to assist them. Particularly where
they both have legal training or experience, the adjudicator and counsel
appear to share a paradigm and have a similar vision of the legal issues
or the steps in the proceeding. This can lead self-represented litigants to
suspect collusion between the adjudicator and counsel.
The reverse is also true: represented parties express discomfort or
dissatisfaction with a process in which they perceive the adjudicator to
be assisting the unrepresented party.'5 They often feel adjudicators give
too much leeway to self-represented parties or become so involved in the
16
presentation of their cases as to create a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Counsel and decision-makers have expressed frustration at having to deal
with self-represented parties because they lack knowledge and fail to
adhere to procedural and substantive rules. Some lament that proceedings
involving self-represented litigants take longer to wend their way through
the legal process, which drains adjudicative and other resources."
1. The challenge ofpassive adjudication
Traditionally, our justice system has been adversarial in nature; it relies on
each party to present the material evidence, identify the key legal issues,
and provide submissions. 8 This model of adjudication assumes that the
parties understand the complex and nuanced rules governing the framing
and presentation of their respective cases.' 9 In essence, it assumes that
each party will have legal representation or, at the very least, the means,
knowledge and ability to effectively represent themselves. 20 Passive
approaches to adjudication, typical of much of our justice system, can be
ineffective where parties do not have legal representation or the ability to
navigate complex legal rules and systems on their own.
15. See Lome D Bertrand et al, "Self-Represented Litigants in Family Law Disputes: Views of
Alberta Lawyers" (2012), Report prepared for the Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family
at 12, online: <www.crilf.ca>.
16. See, e.g., Shemou v ING Insurance Co of Canada, [2007] OFSCD No 157.
17. See, e.g., Gary Joseph, "Don't Encourage Self-Represented Litigants," Letter to the Editor, The
Lav Times (3 June 2013), online: Law Times <www.lawtimesnews.com/201306033257/letters-to-theeditor/don-t-encourage-self-represented-litigants>.
18. Flaherty, supra note 3; Landsman, supra note 3 at 232; Green & Sossin, supra note 3 at 73;
MacDonald, supranote 10 at 59.
19. Traditionally, the adversarial model has been contrasted with the non-adversarial or inquisitorial
process. Green and Sossin describe the standard inquisitorial process in Canada as one in which the
decision-maker plays a truth-seeking role and is more concerned with investigations and findings than
adjudication. Typically, the decision-maker possesses powers to obtain evidence, testimony, and other
relevant information. See Green & Sossin, supra note 3 at 74-75.
20. Landsman, supra note 3 at 232.
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Importantly, the adversarial model becomes less effective where (as is
increasingly the case) parties represent themselves. Where the law, the rules
of procedure, and the legal processes are unintelligible or unfamiliar to
one or more of the litigants, cases stop being a dialogue between informed
and experienced participants within a framework designed to test evidence
and facilitate truth seeking. Instead, cases turn into a frustrating exercise in
imposing legal norms on parties who do not grasp their significance, and
21
who see them as arbitrary, unfair, or simply unintelligible.
Self-represented litigants encounter an array of challenges within our
legal system. 22 Where they cannot understand and apply legal principles
or navigate legal processes, self-represented litigants are at a distinct
disadvantage compared with represented parties. Passive adjudication
can perpetuate that disadvantage. Without some form of direction and
assistance, many self-represented litigants do not appreciate the legal tests
or standards they must meet. This, in turn, makes it difficult for them to
determine what evidence they should present and which arguments might
advhnce their case. Litigation can become akin to donning a blindfold and
hoping for the best. The legal outcome of proceedings may depend on
whether the litigants have mastered legal rules and processes rather than
23
whether their case has merit.
2. Rethinking the adjudicativerole
Much of the early discourse on access to justice focussed on providing
access to counsel. However, legislators and courts have shown little
willingness to fund widespread legal assistance or to create a right to
counsel.2 4 Self-representation is here to stay. Rather than think of selfrepresentation as part of the problem, reality demands that we consider
self-represented litigants as an important part of any solution to the
problem of access to justice. Indeed, the historical roots of many parts of
our administrative justice system lie in a desire to make justice accessible

21. Flaherty, supra note 3.
22. Macfarlane, supra note 12.
23. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, "Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary
Results and Methodological Considerations" (2003) 24:2 Justice System J 163 at 178; Russell
Engler, "And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges,
Mediators, and Clerks" (1999) 67:5 Fordham L Rev 1987 at 1987. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to do so, the fact that I am advocating for active adjudication does call out for a more detailed
consideration of the shortcomings of passive adjudication. More specifically, it bears looking at the
harms active adjudication is designed to address, particularly in the case of self-represented litigants.
I intend to consider some of these issues in a subsequent work.
24. British Columbia (AG) v Christie, 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 SCR 873. See also Carissima Mathen,
"Access to Charter Justice and the Rule of Law" (2008) 25 NJCL 191.
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to people who could not afford to bring their disputes to court. 25 However,
our administrative justice system has tended to import some of the features
of the court system. Over the years, we have fallen very easily into a
pattern of using the judicial model of adjudication as the basis for our
understanding of a fair hearing. As we have seen, however, this judicial
model of adjudication is not effective in contexts where representation is
the exception rather than the norm. Increasing numbers of self-represented
litigants calls into question whether the judicial model of adjudication is
the most appropriate way to adjudicate administrative law matters.
An example may help illustrate why change is necessary. Selfrepresented litigants often view similar fact and good character evidence
as their "smoking gun" and are sometimes unwilling or unable to
understand that it is not admissible under the rules of evidence. Procedural
and evidentiary rulings that may be obvious to counsel and adjudicators
can seem fundamentally unfair to self-represented litigants. There are
legitimate reasons for the law to treat good character and similar fact
evidence the way it does. The difficulty arises in conveying those reasons
to self-represented litigants in a way that is intelligible to them, and that
does not undermine their confidence in the proceeding or the administrative
justice system as a whole.
I and other adjudicators to whom I have spoken have often faced
circumstances where a self-represented litigant arrives at a hearing
with a number of friends and neighbours, whom he says can testify as
to their own negative experiences with the respondent. This litigant is
convinced that the evidence of these witnesses will compellingly establish
that the respondent has discriminated against others and therefore also
discriminated against him. Typically, at some early stage of the hearing,
an adjudicator will hold that this evidence is inadmissible, and that the
tribunal's role is to determine his complaint (not those of the complaints
of the individuals in entourage). While this type of ruling is generally
appropriate, it can be off-putting for the self-represented litigant and can
set a difficult tone for the remainder of the hearing. Among other things,
the ruling may embarrass the litigant in front of his friends and neighbours
and may leave him feeling that his most important evidence has been
excluded for reasons that simply do not make sense to him.
A case from my own adjudicative experience with the Human Rights
Tribunal of Ontario may illustrate how active adjudication can help

25. Lome Sossin, "Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries" in Colleen M Flood &
Lome Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications,
2013) 211.
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address some of these perceptions. In my matter, the respondent and all
seven applicants were self-represented 26 and the case cried out for an
innovative and interventionist approach to adjudication. Had I adopted
a passive approach, entering the hearing room and simply advising the
parties to "Please begin," the hearing might have taken several days. More
importantly, it is not clear to me that (without direction and assistance)
those parties could have presented their case in a way that I could have
meaningfully adjudicated it.
An important feature of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario is that
its enabling statute allows the Tribunal to adopt "alternatives to traditional
adjudicative or adversarial procedures" in order to "facilitate fair, just
and expeditious resolutions of the merits of matters before it." 27 While
the legislation does not define "alternatives to traditional adjudicative or
adversarial procedures," it specifically authorizes the Tribunal to (among
other things) question witnesses, determine the order of evidence, and
28
define and narrow issues.
In this particular case, I began the hearing by setting out my
understanding of the legal issues. I invited the parties to make submissions
to clarify or reformulate those issues. I then explained to the parties how
I intended to conduct the hearing and I gave them an opportunity to
make comments and pose questions about the proposed hearing process.
After some discussion and clarification, all parties consented to the nontraditional hearing approach I had proposed.
Rather than inviting witnesses to testify one at a time, I held a roundtable
discussion and dealt with each of the factual issues chronologically. After
this discussion, in which I often posed questions to the witnesses, the
opposing party had an opportunity to pose additional questions. Each
witness had a chance to provide evidence on each issue. The hearing took
approximately two hours. Although all of the parties may not be satisfied
with the decision, I believe they left the hearing satisfied that they were

26. Gilbert v 2093132 Ontario, 2011 HRTO 672.
27. HRC,supranote I, s41.
28. Ibid, s 43(3). Although similar, these powers are different from case management. Case
management aims to expedite the legal process by streamlining a case and imposing'time limits for
litigation. It offers parties an opportunity to narrow or consolidate issues or to settle so that resources
are most efficiently allocated (Ontario, Attorney General, "Fact Sheet: Civil Case Management
under Rule 77 of the Rules of Civil Procedure," (Ministry of the Attorney General, 2015), online:
<www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/>). Effective case management can certainly be a feature of
active adjudication. However, active adjudication may be much broader than case management and
can (for example) involve a narrowing of issues by the adjudicator (rather than the parties), more
interventionist adjudicative involvement in the presentation of the evidence, and the questioning of the
witness.
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treated fairly, that they were heard, and that their case would be evaluated
based on its merits.29
This is but one example of what appears to be a growing trend in
administrative adjudication. Increasing numbers of self-represented
litigants within the administrative justice system call for innovation in
adjudication. They also raise a host a questions:
* What impact should the rising numbers of self-represented
litigants have on the role of the administrative decision-makers?
" What steps should administrative decision-makers take to address
the needs of self-represented litigants?
* Are there ways to ensure that self-represented litigants can
meaningfully access the administrative justice system?
" Can we do this in a way that ensures that all parties (whether or
not they are represented) are treated fairly?
* Finally, how can we do this in a way that recognizes the particular
needs of self-represented litigants but that all parties perceive to
be fair and impartial?
It would be an overstatement to suggest that administrative tribunals and
decision-makers have responded to these issues in a cohesive or universal
way. However, I posit that there have been two main and overlapping
trends: adjudicative assistance and active adjudication. Each of these
trends involves a shift away from passive adjudication and, potentially,
each raises issues about the perceived impartiality of the adjudicator.
While we will consider each of these trends in turn, it is important to note
that it is not always possible to draw a crisp line between what is meant by
adjudicative assistance and active adjudication. In hearing any given case,
an adjudicator may employ one or both of these approaches.
3. Adjudicative assistancefor the self-representedlitigant
Adjudicative assistance involves providing information, taking steps or
giving directions to help one or both of the parties meaningfully access the
adjudicative process.30 Importantly, in this sense, "assistance" is not about
helping one or the other party succeed; rather, it is about ensuring that
all parties (whether represented or not) have a fair opportunity to present
their case. Indeed, it is critical to distinguish between the two. Situations
where the adjudicator guides the parties, helping them to understand
29. 1 note that this type of approach will not be appropriate in every circumstance. It may be
particularly suitable where at least one party is unrepresented, where the adjudicator has subject matter
expertise, and where more traditional forms of adjudication would make it difficult for one or more of
the parties to present its case.
30. Davids v Davids (1999), 125 OAC 375 at para 36 [Davids].
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and apply the legal and procedural rules, which I have referred to as
"assistance," is properly part of the adjudicator's role. On the other hand,
it is not appropriate for the adjudicator to give the impression he or she is
advocating for or against a particular party-this could lead to a finding
of bias.
Of course, in providing assistance, the adjudicator may also take on
a more active role; however, he or she will not necessarily take control of
or direct the hearing process. Parties may be left to control and present
their own case, but they will receive some measure of assistance as
they do so.3' For example, an adjudicator may assist a self-represented
party by explaining the rules of evidence, by applying those rules with
greater flexibility, or by alerting the party to an issue it had not raised
on its own. There have been a number of significant decisions, including
from appellate courts, directing adjudicators to provide some measure of
assistance to self-represented litigants.3 2 This jurisprudence has led to a
key, albeit incremental shift in the role of the adjudicator. It also raises
important issues about impartiality.
The trend towards adjudicative assistance arose out of fairness
concerns and a realization that, absent some help, many self-represented
parties cannot navigate the legal system or present their case in a way that
it can be meaningfully adjudicated. For example, can a hearing really be

31. See Universal Workers Union v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2006), 39 Admin LR
(4th) 285 (Ont Sup Ct) [Universal Workers]. This case involved allegations of discrimination by a
member against his union. Partway into the hearing, the Tribunal allowed the applicant to amend
the pleadings to include several additional allegations. The Tribunal then directed parties to present
the evidence of specific witnesses whom those parties would not otherwise have chosen to call. The
union objected, arguing that procedural fairness entitled it to present its own case, without interference
from the Tribunal. The Divisional Court agreed and quashed the Tribunal's order directing parties to
present specific witnesses. It held that the principles of procedural fairness contemplate an adversarial
model and that the Tribunal had breached those principles by adopting an inquisitorial approach to
the hearing. It is noteworthy that, in reaching this conclusion, the Divisional Court relied on R v
Svain, [1991] 1 SCR 933, a criminal law case, where the Supreme Court of Canada explained that
the criminal justice system is an adversarial one. See also R v Switzer, 2014 ABCA 129, 572 AR 311.
In Universal Workers, the Divisional Court integrated this principle into administrative law without
further analysis. It is also noteworthy that Universal Workers pre-dates the amendments to the HRC,
supra note 1, which specifically provide for non-traditional adjudicative methods. It is unclear how
more inquisitorial measures would be dealt with post-amendment, particularly as the HRC now gives
the Tribunal powers that are, essentially, inquisitorial in nature. Section 43 authorizes the Tribunal to
require a party to produce documents, information, evidence and witnesses who are reasonably within
the party's control. Despite these statutory powers, the Tribunal has not tended to be inquisitorial or to
direct parties to adduce evidence they would not otherwise have called.
32. Flaherty, supra note 3. See Davids, supra note 30 at para 36. See also Baziuk v BDO Dunwoody
Ward Mallette (1979), 13 CPC (4th) 156 at para 18 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)); Barrett v Layton (2004), 69
OR (3d) 384 (Sup Ct) [Barrett]; Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v JA, 2006 MBCA
44,205 Man R (2d) 50; Rv Rice, 2011 ONSC 5532,97 WCB (2d) 338; Rv McGibbon (1988), 31 OAC
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fair if the self-represented party cannot frame the issues in dispute in terms
of the legal test or cannot appreciate what she needs to prove in order
to be successful?33 These considerations have led adjudicators to provide
assistance to litigants, ranging from help that is purely procedural in nature
(explaining the rules of procedure and how the hearing will unfold) to that
which is more substantive (including identifying issues that have not been
raised by the parties).
Indeed, the jurisprudence now recognizes that an adjudicator plays
some role, if not in leveling the playing field for self-represented litigants,
then at least in creating a climate in which they can present their cases
to the best of their abilities. Clearly, adjudicators cannot and should not
be a substitute for representation. No matter how much assistance they
receive from the adjudicator, self-represented litigants will never have the
same advantages as parties that are expertly represented. Arguably, this
illustrates the limitations of active adjudication and calls out for a broader
rethinking of how we approach adjudication: can a complex rule-based
system ever be fully accessed without expert representation, no matter
34
how hard adjudicators work at improving strategies?
Although they cannot fully compensate for representation, adjudicators
should be mindful of the role they can play in addressing some of the needs
and challenges faced by self-represented litigants. It is often unclear what
exactly this role is in practice and there has been considerable debate as
to the scope and type of assistance an adjudicator can provide.35 It can be
difficult to determine how much help is too much, as a great deal depends
on the context, the nature of the case, and the abilities of the litigants.
As I will discuss in more detail, notions of fairness and impartiality
are important factors that can help determine the appropriate limits on
adjudicative assistance.
4. Active adjudication
Generally speaking, active adjudication involves the adjudicator
actively shaping or directing the hearing process. Rather than leaving
the presentation of the case entirely to the parties, the active adjudicator
provides some measure of direction. An active adjudicator might, for
example, dispense with opening statements, frame the legal issues for the
parties and then invite them to comment or make submissions on how the
33. Macdonald, supra note 10; Barrett, supra note 32.
34. 1 hope to address this issue in future research about alternatives for dispute resolution in the
administrative setting, including mediation-adjudication. By shifting our approach to determining
issues away from reliance on complex rules, we may enhance parties' ability to meaningfully and
fairly present their cases.
35. Flaherty, supra note 3.
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legal issues have been framed. An active adjudicator might also direct the
order in which the parties will present evidence.
For example, where one or more of the parties is self-represented, I
generally do away with opening statements. In part, I and others do this
because self-represented litigants often have great difficulty distinguishing
between an opening statement and evidence. It can be impossible for them
to talk about their case, even in general terms, without effectively providing
evidence (even though they are not under oath). Instead, I begin hearings
by summarizing my understanding of the legal and factual issues in dispute
based on the pleadings. I then invite the parties to provide clarifications
or make submissions on issues they feel I have misunderstood or not
identified. The practice often makes for a more efficient hearing: it avoids
the need to explain the subtle difference between argument and evidence
to self-represented litigants. It also helps both parties frame the issues and
understand what they need to establish in order to succeed.
Active adjudication can have the overall impact of assisting one
or more of the parties, particularly those who are self-represented and
might have difficulty navigating a legal process without such direction.
However, although it may be the corollary effect, the objective of active
adjudication is not necessarily to help any particular party access justice,
but rather to create a process that is fair and accessible to all parties. Active
adjudication attempts to eliminate or at least mitigate some of what has
traditionally made lawyers indispensable to the proper functioning of the
hearing. Arguably, the advantages of active adjudication extend beyond
self-represented litigants: active adjudication can lead to a more efficient
and timely proceeding in which each party has nevertheless had a fair
36
opportunity to present its case.
Active adjudication can take on different degrees, ranging from the
adjudicator who provides directions concerning the order of the proceeding
to one who raises legal issues and takes the lead in questioning witnesses.
The degree of adjudicator involvement or activity will depend on factors
such as the tribunal's statutory powers, the style of the adjudicator, the

36. Gottheil & Ewart, supra note 6. Consider, for example, cases where one party is represented
and the other is not. Active adjudication can help the parties frame the issues in the case, manage
the evidence and administer the proceeding in a way that avoids unnecessarily prolonged hearings,
which in turn can limit the legal costs of the opposing party and be a more efficient use of adjudicative
resources.
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needs of the parties, the issues at stake, and the nature of the proposed
evidence.37
Lome Sossin describes active adjudication as a sort of midway point
between the adversarial and inquisitorial models of adjudication.38 As we
have seen, the adversarial model is characterized by minimal adjudicative
intervention and control of the proceeding by the parties. Conversely,
under an inquisitorial model, the tribunal controls the proceeding and takes
the lead in eliciting information. Inquisitorial decision-makers often have
a range of statutory powers that allow them to call evidence and engage
in independent fact-finding.3 9 Active adjudication has many features of
the adversarial model, but also some of the characteristics of an inquirybased process. For example, as with the adversarial process, the parties
to an active adjudication remain responsible for adducing evidence. An
active adjudicator does not engage in independent fact-finding. An active
adjudicator may take the lead in questioning witnesses, although parties
retain the ability to ask questions also, subject to adjudicative direction
regarding the order of witnesses and the scope of questioning.
In some cases, the ability to actively adjudicate will flow explicitly
from statute. As we have seen, this is the case with the Ontario Human
Rights Code, which specifically contemplates "alternatives to traditional
adjudicative or adversarial procedures." 4 Among the tribunal's statutory
powers are the ability to define or narrow the issues required to dispose
of an application and limit the evidence and submissions of the parties
on such issues, determine the order in which the issues and evidence in a
proceeding will be presented, and conduct examinations in chief or crossexaminations of a witness.4
In other cases, a tribunal may move towards active adjudication of
its own initiative and without any specific grant of statutory authority.
The Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) is a good example of this. It
has no specific statutory power to actively adjudicate. 42 Moreover, it is
37. See Green & Sossin, supra note 3 at 74. See also Ontario, Attorney General, Report of the
Ontario Human Rights Review, 2012, by Andrew Pinto (Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2012) at 66-67
[Pinto].
38. Green & Sossin, supra note 3 at 71.
39. An inquisitorial model is more common under the civil law tradition. Common law examples
include commissions of public inquiry and coroner's inquests: ibid at 74-75.
40. HRC, supra note 1,s43(3)
41. The HRC also gives the Tribunal latitude to deviate from the Statutory Powers Procedure
Act, RSO 1990, c S.22 [SPPA], legislation that sets out procedural requirements that administrative
tribunals must comply with when conducting an oral hearing. Section 42(1) of the HRC states that the
provisions of the SPPA apply unless they conflict with a provision of the HRC, the regulations or the
Tribunal rules.
42. See s 142.1 of the EnvironmentalProtection Act, RSO 1990, c E. 19, as amended.
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bound by Ontario's Statutory Powers ProcedureAct. The SPPA sets out
an adversarial adjudication paradigm, along with a series of procedural
requirements that must be adhered to in any oral hearing held by the
ERT. The ERT introduced active adjudication by amending its rules of
procedure in a number of ways that continue to comply with the SPPA, but
43
also support a more active approach to adjudication.
Active adjudication has the advantage of being flexible and easily
adaptable to the nature of the question and the needs and relative abilities
of the parties. However, with flexibility comes uncertainty. While rules
of procedure, guidelines and practice directions can alert parties to a
tribunal's use of active adjudication, it is sometimes difficult for even the
adjudicator to gauge just how actively she will be involved in the case
until the hearing process begins. For example, a party appearing before the
ERT or the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario may expect some degree
of active adjudication. However, that party cannot necessarily anticipate
just how active the adjudication will be. Will the tribunal member question
witnesses or will that be left to the parties and their representatives?
Should the parties ensure that all witnesses are present at the outset of
the hearing, just in case the tribunal directs them to testify in a particular
order? This uncertainty can pose challenges for all parties, who may feel
uncomfortable with the process and how to prepare for it.
Represented parties, in particular, have expressed concern that active
adjudication may be problematic, particularly as it might compromise
adjudicators' impartiality.44 Indeed, when the Ontario Human Rights
Code amendments came into effect in 2008, some members of the legal
community questioned whether active adjudication "would tip into
unfairness by Tribunal members directing how hearings should proceed

43. For a more detailed discussion, see Gottheil & Ewart, supra note 6. The ERT's rules state that
the Tribunal may: identify and narrow issues, determine the order in which evidence will be presented;
question witnesses; and, limit the time allotted for the parties' questioning of witnesses, as well as the
time permitted for making submissions in Rules 179-185. The purpose of this paper is not to discuss
in depth the procedural fairness issues that may arise in active adjudication. However, it bears noting
that, although the ERT rules have not been the subject of judicial review, courts have upheld active
adjudicative practices introduced through rules of procedure in other cases (see Canada(Citizenship
and Immigration) v Thamotharem, 2007 FCA 198, [2008] 1 FCR 385 [Thamotharem]). See also
Leonard Marvy & David A Wright, "'Master of Its Own House': Procedural Fairness and Deference
to Ontario Labour Relations Board Procedure: Case Comment on International Brotherhood of
ElectricalWorkers, Local 1739 v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers and Amalgamated
Transit Union Local 113 v. Ontario Labour Relations Board" (2008) 21 Can J Admin L & Prac 361.
44. Pinto, supranote 37 at 66.
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in an improper or biased manner."45 However, in a review of the Ontario
human rights system, conducted three years after the amendments, Andrew
Pinto found "little evidence of this" and, in fact, recommended that the
Tribunal make even more use of active adjudication.46
Pinto does not explain why active adjudication appears to be working
at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. I posit that it has much to do
with the parties' perception that the Tribunal's more active and directive
approach allows it to fairly determine disputes. A number of factors likely
informed and led to the success of the Tribunal's approach: its adjudicators
have human rights expertise; the overwhelming number of parties
appearing before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario are unrepresented;
and, traditional adjudicative methods would often be ineffective in this
context.
The concerns initially expressed about the Human Rights Tribunal
of Ontario's active adjudication have turned out to be largely theoretical.
The reviewer found that parties (whether represented or not) have not
tended to perceive the Tribunal's more active role as unfair or biased.
The reviewer's positive assessment of active adjudication appears to
be based on an absence of complaints, and while this approach served
the reviewer's purpose, it does not give much guidance to adjudicators
or parties. It is important to get beyond the complaint test and begin to
assess, in a principled manner, whether adjudicators' expanding roles and
non-traditional adjudicative practices raise concerns about unfairness or
impartiality.
II. Substantive impartiality
We have seen that some administrative adjudicators are moving away from
the traditional passive, adversarial model of adjudication and becoming
more active and directive participants in the legal proceeding. How is this
more active and directive role to be reconciled with the decision-maker's
duty to determine cases fairly and impartially? How much direction
and assistance can adjudicators provide before crossing the line and
descending into the so-called arena of litigation? Does the existing legal
test for impartiality accommodate the changing adjudicative role?

45. Ibid. See also Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act Alliance, "Analysis of the
November 2012 Final Report of the Andrew Pinto Review of Ontario's New System for Enforcing
Human Rights in Ontario: Damning Findings of a Human Rights Enforcement System in Trouble,
Wrongly Papered Over as a 'Qualified Success' (AODA, 12 November 2012) at 26, online: <www.
aoda.ca>.
46. Pinto, supra note 37 at 66.
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The impartiality of the adjudicator is a cornerstone of the legal system
and a key component of procedural fairness.47 Procedural fairness has
two dimensions: the right to a hearing and the right to have that hearing
conducted by an impartial decision-maker. There are a number of different
ways in which a decision-maker may become partial-she may have
a personal stake in the outcome of the case, the tribunal itself may not
be sufficiently independent, or the decision-maker may behave or make
comments that suggest she is not approaching the dispute with an open
mind. 48 This piece focuses on a different aspect of impartiality, namely,
whether an adjudicator will be perceived as biased because she is assisting
the parties or directing the conduct of the hearing. In this section, we will
consider whether decision-makers can maintain their impartiality while
providing direction and adjudicating actively.
Impartiality has been characterized as a "legal boundary," a line
that decision-makers may not cross without undermining the fairness
of the proceedings.4 9 Not only does an impartial process lead to more
legitimate legal outcomes, it is also necessary to foster credibility in the
administrative justice system and to promote voluntary compliance with
decisions. Decision-makers' authority rests on the public's confidence in
the decision-making process and the legal system in general.50 To believe
in the system and be prepared to accept decisions with which they may
disagree, parties must feel that their cases are being determined fairly, by
an open-minded adjudicator who has no personal interest in the outcome. 5'

47. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principlesfor Judges (Ottawa: CJC, 1998) at 30, online: CJC
<www.cjc-ecm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/newspubjudicialconductPrinciples en.pdf> [CJC, Ethical
Principles]. See also Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at paras 57-59, [2003] 2 SCR
259 [Wewaykum]; Aharon Barak, "A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy"
(2002) 116:1 Harv L Rev 19 at 55. The focus of this paper is the impartiality of the administrative
decision-maker, specifically in relation to the trend towards a more active and directive role of the
adjudicator.
48. Lome Sossin, "An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in
Administrative Law" (2002) 27:2 Queen's LJ 809 [Sossin, "Intimate Approach"].
49. Baker v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 45 [Baker]; Sossin,
"Intimate Approach," supra note 48 at 817.
50. Jula Hughes & Philip Bryden, "Refining the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Test: Providing
Judges Better Tools for Addressing Judicial Disqualification" (2013) 36:1 Dal U 171 at 175.
51. Barak, supra note 47 at 59; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of
Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 SCR 3; Provincial Court Judges'Assn of New Brunswick v New
Brunswick (Minister of Justice), 2005 SCC 44, [2005] 2 SCR 286; Wewaykum, supra note 47 at
para 57; Gray, supra note 3 at 99; Richard Zorza, "The Disconnect Between the Requirements of
Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance. of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes,
Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications" (2004) 17:3 Geo J Leg Ethics 423 at 426 [Zorza,
"The Disconnect"]. Hughes & Bryden, supra note 50 at 179-180.

136 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The legal test for impartiality is a long-standing one.5 2 It was set out as
follows by de Grandpr6 J., writing in dissent, in Committeefor Justiceand
Liberty v. National Energy Board:
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable
and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and
obtaining thereon the required information... [T]hat test is "what would
an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practicallyand having thought the matter through-conclude. Would he think that
it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously
or unconsciously, would not decide fairly."53
Built into this legal test is a strong presumption that the decision-maker
is impartial. The party alleging bias has the onus of demonstrating a
reasonable apprehension of bias and the standard for doing so is high.54
The legal test focuses on the perceptions of a reasonable person rather
than proof of actual bias. As Bryden and Hughes explain, there are many
reasons for this, including the importance of the repute of the public
justice system and the practical and evidentiary difficulties associated with
establishing actual bias. 5
56
The application of the test is highly contextual and fact specific.
For an administrative decision-maker, the requisite level of impartiality
(i.e, the extent of the procedural protections required) depends on a
number of factors, including the nature and function of the tribunal.57
Indeed, the legal test for impartiality is broadly framed around a standard
of "reasonableness." This standard invites consideration of an array of
contextual factors. While the test has the advantage of being applicable to a
range of circumstances, its flexibility also leads to variability in outcomes.
Particularly in borderline cases, where there are valid arguments for and
against recusal, decision-makers may apply the same legal test, but reach
58
different "reasonable" conclusions.

52. See Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, "The Tip of the Iceberg: A Survey of the Philosophy and
Practice of Canadian Provincial and Territorial Judges Concerning Judicial Disqualification" (2011)
48:3 Alta L Rev 569 at 570; Hughes & Bryden, supra note 50 at 172.
53. Committeefor Justice and Liberty v NationalEnergy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369.
54. Wewaykum, supra note 47 at para 174 and Adam M Dodek, "Constitutional Legitimacy and
Responsibility: Confronting Allegations of Bias After Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada"(2004) 25
SCLR (2d) 165 at 171.
55. Hughes & Bryden, supra note 50 at 176. See also Wewaykum, supra note 47 at paras 62-68.
56. Wewaykum, supra note 47 at paras 62-68.
57. Baker, supra note 49. This paper focuses on administrative tribunals that are adjudicative in
function and that typically hold hearings before determining the cases before them.
58. Hughes & Bryden, supra note 50.
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Some jurisdictions have created adjudicative guidelines regarding
impartiality.59 Although they are conceptually helpful, these guidelines
provide limited practical guidance to decision-makers. In assessing
impartiality, adjudicators are left with broad principles and contextual
factors, but few hard or fast answers. As the Supreme Court of Canada
explained in Wewaykum, there are no shortcuts to a contextual analysis.6"
Until relatively recently, adjudicators understood the principle of
impartiality to impose a strict prohibition on assisting or directing any
party, including self-represented litigants. 6' This vision of impartiality
has played an important role in shaping traditional adjudicative roles.
It helps explain why, despite some of the recent trends emerging in the
jurisprudence, many adjudicators remain most comfortable playing a
passive role.62
Like many of our legal rules and processes, however, the traditional
interpretation of "impartiality" arose from an era and mindset where
representation was the norm. Our notion of impartiality was framed in a
time of closer adherence to a passive and adversarial model of adjudication.
However, as self-representation becomes the new norm, the ongoing
validity of this approach is called into question. To put it differently: if it is
unfair to expect self-represented litigants to navigate the hearing process
without adjudicative assistance and direction, it is also unfair to insist on
a vision of impartiality that prevents adjudicators from intervening with
direction or assistance.
There is a natural tension between the traditional view of impartiality
and the more active and directive role many adjudicators are adopting.
The tension is perhaps most apparent in matters involving self-represented
litigants, where an obligation to assist or a tendency to direct most often
arises. 63 Self-represented litigants may cry foul because they do not like
or agree with the help or direction that is being provided. They may also
complain that the level of adjudicative assistance does not go far enough. 64
59. See, e.g., CJC, Ethical Principles,supranote 47 at 20: "[s]triking this balance may be particularly
challenging when one party is represented by a lawyer and another is not. While doing whatever
is possible to prevent unfair disadvantage to the unrepresented party, the judge must be careful to
preserve his or her impartiality." See also Goldschmidt, supra note 3 at 608.
60. Weivaykum, supra note 47 at para 77.
61. Engler, supra note 23 at 1989 and Richard Zorza, "An Overview of Self-Represented Litigation
Innovation, Its Impact, and an Approach for the Future: An Invitation to Dialogue" (2009) 43:3 Fam
LQ 519 at 529. See Denning LJ in Jones v National Coal Board, [1957] 2 All ER 155 at 159 (CA),
citing Yuill v Yuill, [1945] 1 All ER 183 (CA). Goldschmidt, supra note 3 at 602. See also Landsman,
supra note 3 at 245.
62. Gray, supra note 3 at 98.
63. CJC, Ethical Principles, supra note 47.
64. Child and Family Services of Winnipeg v JA, 2004 MBCA 184, 247 DLR (4th) 490 [JA].
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In wading more actively into the litigation, adjudicators also risk that
the opposing party will allege bias because it feels the adjudicator has
gone too far to compensate for the absence of counsel. 65 As the Manitoba
Court of Appeal put it, "balanc[ing] the sometimes competing imperatives
of helping a litigant who is in need of assistance while maintaining
impartiality is a recurring dilemma for [adjudicators at all levels]." 66
The traditional legal test supports a vision of impartiality that is both
principled and consistent with the changing adjudicative role. Rather than
focusing on the tension between impartiality, on the one hand, and active
adjudication and adjudicative assistance on the other, it is more helpful to
conceive of all of these issues in terms of fairness. Indeed, fairness is the
nodal point where impartiality and non-traditional adjudication meet. The
same fairness concerns that have begun to reshape the role of adjudicators
67
are also at the very heart of the doctrine of impartiality.
As William Lucy has explained, there is a nexus between these two
notions. In his view, impartiality does not refer simply to the attitude
and role of the adjudicator, it incorporates the process through which
determinations are made.68 In other words, procedures that favour the
represented litigant undermine the impartiality of the decision-making
process. Or, as Lucy puts it, "procedural impartiality" increases the
likelihood that the adjudicator will reach a merits-based or "impartial"
outcome. The objective, then, is to strive for both an impartial adjudicator
and an impartial decision-making process. Arguably, this is best achieved
through an expanded role for the adjudicator, one in which she may play
an active role to mitigate the procedural advantage generally enjoyed by
represented parties.
In defining the role of the adjudicator, the governing principle should
be "what is fair for all of the parties in the circumstances?" Answering this
question involves considering both: the level of adjudicative assistance
and direction the parties need in order to meaningfully present their case
(procedural impartiality); and what, in the particular circumstances,
reasonably gives rise to an apprehension that the decision-maker is biased
or partial (attitude of the adjudicator). Reconciling these issues under the
unifying principle of fairness leads to what I have termed the "substantive
impartiality model. 69 In an earlier paper, I explained that substantive
65. See Bertrand et al, supra note 15. See also Barrett, supra note 32.
66. JA, supra note 64 at para 32.
67. Baker, supra note 49 at 45. Nevfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 SCR 623 at 625.
68. William Lucy, "The Possibility of Impartiality" (2005) 25:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 3 at 8, 23.
69. Flaherty, supranote 3 at 331.
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impartiality borrows from the notion of substantive equality, a principle
developed under section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Substantive equality does not require identical treatment of all individuals;
rather, it allows for different treatment of differently situated individuals,
as their particular needs and circumstances require. Similarly, substantive
impartiality is not necessarily about treating parties the same, but instead
about treating them fairly, or, in this context, providing self-represented
litigants with the meaningful assistance and direction they need to navigate
within the legal system.70
Although they do not articulate impartiality issues in terms of
substantive impartiality or, as Lucy suggested, procedural impartiality,
courts have shown a willingness to consider the needs of self-represented
litigants as they assess impartiality. Arguably, a substantive impartiality
approach fits naturally within the existing legal test because fairness
considerations-including the fact that a self-represented litigant may not
have meaningful access to adjudication without some assistance-are part
of a contextual analysis of impartiality.
Indeed, a number of trends emerging from the case law are consistent
with the notion of substantive impartiality. First, we have seen a shift
away from equating impartiality to adjudicative passivity.7 While
adjudicators will almost always respect at least the traditional notion of
impartiality, there is increasing recognition that it can get in the way of
a fair hearing. Second, fairness has emerged as the guiding principle that
shapes adjudicative approaches and assessments of impartiality. When
they seek out the delicate balance between assistance and direction and
impartiality, courts are guided by principles of fairness. For example, in
Barrett v. Layton, the represented party asked the judge to recuse herself
because she had provided "counsel-like assistance" to the unrepresented
party. In that case, the judge had drawn the self-represented litigant's
attention to certain aspects of her defence (which had been drafted by her
then counsel) and suggested the litigant might wish to address these issues
in cross-examination.72

70. Ibid at 329.
71. See, e.g., Noronha v 1174364 Ontario Ltd, 2009 HRTO 1292 [Noronha]. Noronha has been
cited for the proposition that the Tribunal's active case management does not give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. See Sebhatu v Starvood Canada Corp, 2012 HRTO 329; Ihasz v Ontario
(Ministerof Revenue), 2013 HRTO 333; Restrepo Benitez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 461, [2007] 1 FCR 107; Hundal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 884,
29 1mm LR (3d) 197; Rajaratnam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1663, 144
ACWS (3d) 724; Thamotharem, supra note 43. For a discussion about the apparent conflict between
engagement and impartiality in the US context, see Zorza, "The Disconnect," supra note 51.
72. Barrett, supranote 32 at 389.
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The court's conclusion that this type of assistance did not give rise
to a reasonable apprehension of bias was grounded in a fairness analysis.
The court explained that a fair hearing must ensure "that an unrepresented
person is not denied a trial on the merits by her lack of knowledge of either
the trial process or procedural and substantive law, or by the stress of
appearing in court, or by a combination of these factors." According to the
court, drawing the self-represented litigant's attention to certain aspects of
her defence allowed for a meaningful adjudication of the claim, without
73
compromising the fairness of the process for either party.
Third, although framed in terms of procedural fairness rather than
impartiality, active adjudicative methods have generally withstood scrutiny
on judicial review. For example, cases challenging the Ontario Labour
Relations Board's statutory powers, including its ability to determine a
case following a "consultation" rather than a formal hearing, have been
unsuccessful. It is also significant that courts have held that directive and
active adjudication methods employed by that Board met the requirements
74
of procedural fairness.
Fourth, although now in a position to play a more active and directive
role, adjudicators must nevertheless employ these techniques in a way
that preserves the appearance of impartiality. To put this differently,
while active adjudication and adjudicative assistance are not necessarily
problematic in and of themselves, these techniques can be employed in
a way that creates a reasonable apprehension of bias.75 As the Court of
Appeal explained in Lennox:
A trial judge is expected and entitled to take reasonable steps to ensure
that the issues are clear, that evidence is presented in an organized and
efficient manner and that the trial runs smoothly and proceeds in a timely
manner. Trial judges are also entitled to intervene in the trial where there
is need for clarification. However, there is a point7 6at which judicial
"intervention becomes interference and is improper.
Consider the example of Limoges v. Investors Group FinancialServices
Inc.77 Although this was a civil case of wrongful dismissal, not an
administrative law matter, it nevertheless helps illustrate the distinction
between permissible levels of adjudicative assistance and behaviour
that gives rise to an apprehension of bias. In Limoges, the plaintiff was
73.
(3d)
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid at 391. See also Tran, supra note 8;Lennox v Arbor Memorial Services Inc (2001), 56 OR
795 (CA) [Lennox].
Wright & Marvy, supra note 43 at 361; Noronha, supranote 71.
Limoges, supranote 8.
Lennox, supra note 73 at para 13.
Limoges, supranote 8.
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employed as a sales representative for approximately three years. She
signed a contract stipulating that her status was that of an independent
contractor and that her remuneration would be based solely on commissions
from sales. After a period of probation during which she did not meet
many of the company's performance benchmarks, the plaintiff's job was
terminated, allegedly for cause. She sued for wrongful dismissal and
unpaid commissions, representing herself at the trial.
The trial judge took a number of steps that might be characterized
as assisting the plaintiff. At the beginning of the trial, the judge advised
the plaintiff that her suit would best be cast as an action for unjust
enrichment rather than wrongful dismissal. He then granted the plaintiff
some procedural latitude, adjourning the trial to allow the plaintiff to call
a witness. The judge did this although the plaintiff had not taken any steps
to ensure that witness' attendance and even though the issue on which
she would testify had been in dispute from the outset of the proceedings.
Finally, the judge allowed the plaintiff to call two witnesses before her
own cross-examination. In effect, the plaintiff's witnesses were allowed to
present theirevidence in the course of the plaintiff's own direct testimony.
The reviewing court did not take specific issue with any of these
assistive measures. It recognized that such measures are sometimes
appropriate, noting that strict compliance with the rules of evidence and
procedure is not always necessary or efficacious, particularly where one or
both of the parties is self-represented.78 The problem in Limoges, and what
gave rise to an apprehension of actual bias, was many of the statements the
trial judge made during the course of the hearing. As the reviewing court
explained:
This was a remarkable trial. The trial judge chose to ignore the rules
of evidence and procedure. In addition, he failed to observe even the
most basic legal principles designed to ensure a fair trial and to maintain
the impartiality of the tribunal. More specifically, the trial judge made
critical findings of fact before the defendant could present its evidence,
or even cross-examine the plaintiff and her witnesses. He then used those
premature and poorly conceived findings to threaten the defendant with
punitive costs if it did not settle with the plaintiff immediately. When the
defendant refused to accede to this suggestion, the trial judge denigrated

78.

Ibid at para 22.
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the testimony of the defendant's corporate officer before he had heard it
all. The trial judge's many departures from appropriate judicial conduct
rendered this lhearing unfair.79
In sum, we can conceive of adjudicative behaviour as lying along a
spectrum, with clearly permissible behaviour at one end and clearly
impermissible behaviour at the other. Conduct that falls between those
two points is more difficult to assess. Although the jurisprudence provides
a framework for the analysis, with "reasonableness" and "fairness" as the
basis of the assessment, these are flexible terms that can accommodate a
range of outcomes.
Some measure of uncertainty is inevitable, perhaps particularly in these
early days of more active and directive adjudication and before a more
significant body of jurisprudence develops on the issue. This uncertainty
may mean that adjudicators are reluctant to embrace their "new" role, for
fear of being deemed biased or unfair by a reviewing court.8 0 For some,
wading into the hearing to shape or direct it is akin to sticking one's neck
out and inviting a judicial review. As one adjudicator put it to me, active
adjudication "gives us one more opportunity to get something wrong."
My discussion to date has focused on active adjudication as a
means of ensuring a fair hearing, particularly where representation is
unbalanced. We cannot ignore, however, that for administrative tribunals,
active adjudication is also a way of bringing about efficiencies. From the
perspective of an administrative tribunal, active adjudication can mean
shorter hearings and more efficient use of adjudicator resources. This may
lead to institutional pressure on members to adjudicate actively. In the
end, this too will be about balancing fairness concerns with the interests in
conducting an expeditious hearing.
III. Self-represented litigants: Towards a better understandingof
impartiality
While the legal test for impartiality is deeply enshrined in ourjurisprudence
and well-known to counsel, it is far from intuitive to many self-represented
litigants. Indeed, the legal test for impartiality is among the legal rules and
processes that many self-represented litigants struggle to understand and
apply. There is often a disconnect between what self-represented litigants
79. Ibid at para 6. The Ontario Court ofAppeal made similar comments in the recent case of Hazelton
Lanes Inc v 1707590 Ontario Ltd, 2014 ONCA 793, 326 OAC 301. In that case, the trial judge was
found (among other things) to have made comments and interjections indicating that he had prejudged
the credibility of a witness. The trial judge also made findings and gave directions that gave rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias.
80. Gray, supra note 3 at 98. See also Jona Goldschmidt, "How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?" (1998) 82:1 Judicature 13 at 15.
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expect of adjudicators and how counsel and the adjudicators themselves
see their role. 8' This disconnect may cause the self-represented litigant
to question the fairness of the process and the legitimacy of the legal
outcome. It can lead self-represented litigants to unreasonably claim bias,
which can not only delay the adjudicative process, but can personalize the
proceeding and make it more difficult for all of the parties involved.
Those who are legally trained understand and expect that adjudicators
will exercise discretion in making their rulings. For self-represented
litigants, however, the exercise of adjudicative discretion can feel unfair,
akin to sand shifting beneath their feet. This may be particularly the case
for a litigant who stayed up half the night the night before a hearing to
learn a set of rules only to find that that they are applied quite differently
than they may have expected or understood. For example, those of us who
are legally trained take for granted that procedural fairness influences
how rules will be applied. While the rules may require that all documents
be disclosed in advance of the hearing, adjudicators regularly admit
documents that were not disclosed in accordance with the rules. 2 For the
self-represented litigant, this can seem unfair
Self-represented litigants often view the fact that adjudicators rule on
allegations of their own impartiality as a perpetuation of the unfairness. As
Hughes and Bryden explain, "a party who has unsuccessfully challenged
the judge's impartiality is forced to accept what appears to be the highly
subjective assessment of a judge whose impartiality, at least in the eyes of
that party, is already suspect." 3 It is difficult for self-represented litigants
to understand that an adjudicator determining a recusal application is
not acting as the judge in his or her own case.84 Indeed, the case law is
rife with examples of self-represented litigants who ask adjudicators to
recuse themselves based on a misconception of the notion of bias. 5 In
Murray v. New Brunswick (Police Commission) 6 Robertson J.A. spoke
of a category of self-represented litigants who "operate... on the mistaken
assumption that if he or she is unsuccessful on any ruling it is because
81. McPhee v Canadian Union ofPublicEmployees, 2008 NSCA 104, 270 NSR (2d) 265 [McPhee].
82. Generally, parties would be given a reasonable time to review any such documents and, in some
circumstances, it is appropriate to adjourn the hearing to give them an opportunity to do so.
83. Hughes & Bryden, supranote 50 at 180.
84. Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Portland, OR: Hart
Publishing, 2009). Hughes & Bryden, supranote 50.
85. See, e.g., Noronha, supra note 71; McPhee, supra note 81, Bialy v Public Service Alliance
of Canada, 2012 PSLRB 125; Boshra v Canada (AG), 2012 FC 681, 410 FTR 240; Doncaster v
Chignecto-CentralRegional School Board, 2013 NSCA 59, 330 NSR (2d) 82; Petty v Johnston, 2001
ABQB 383, 105 ACWS (3d) 67; Ross v Charlottetown (City oJ), 2008 PESCAD 6, 276 Nfld & PEIR
162; Zivkovic v Zivkovic, 2009 ABQB 542, 2009 AJ No 1019 (QL).
86. Murray v New Brunswick (Police Commission) (2012), 389 NBR (2d) 372.
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of bias on the part of the decision-maker." In some cases, this approach
appears to be tactical. In others, however, it seems to stem from a genuine
misunderstanding of the notion of impartiality.
Jurists are familiar with the reasonableness and fairness standards
as an analytical framework. However, the concept sits less comfortably
with self-represented litigants: many see themselves as the embodiment
of the reasonable litigant and are astonished that their concerns about the
partiality of the adjudicator are deemed to be "unreasonable." The ongoing
debate about what knowledge and experience should be attributed to the
"reasonable person" can be particularly difficult for a self-represented
87
litigant to grasp.
To address some of the confusion and misperceptions about bias,
administrative tribunals should consider adopting rules or issuing practice
directions and information points for litigants wishing to raise bias
allegations. Few tribunals have done so, despite the significant numbers
of ultimately unfounded bias applications that tend to be brought by selfrepresented litigants. The challenge in constructing general guidelines
arises from the flexibility of the test for impartiality, the importance
of contextual factors, and the variability in "reasonable" outcomes.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, some general principles do arise out of the
jurisprudence. Simply making these principles known to self-represented
litigants may reduce the number of frivolous recusal motions and the
resulting delays and costs.
Importantly, this is not to suggest that adjudicators should engage
in a discussion of these principles with litigants who are contemplating
bringing bias applications. I am proposing something quite different-that
administrative tribunals proactively educate parties about bias, outside
the context of any particular litigation. Tribunals could prepare and
make available general statements about bias, which will help all parties
understand the applicable principles and processes.
Rules or practice directions of this nature could:
1. Make clear that the litigant must raise bias concerns at the earliest
opportunity and that she may be deemed to have waived this right
at a later stage in the proceeding. It is not generally appropriate
to raise issues of bias only after the hearing is complete and the
tribunal's decision has been issued.

87.

Hughes & Bryden, supra note 50; Sossin, "Intimate Approach," supra note 48 at 821.
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Explain that the adjudicator herself will be tasked with determining
the bias allegation.88 Explaining to litigants that this is the normal
procedure may help to dispel fairness concerns and, at a minimum,
the role of the adjudicator will not come as a surprise to them. The
litigant will understand that all parties who raise issues of bias are
treated in this manner.
Set out the legal test for impartiality and explain (in general terms)
how it has been applied. For example, the practice direction should
explain that just because one disagrees with the adjudicator's
decision does not mean that he or she was biased. The practice
direction might provide some examples from the tribunal (or from
the reviewing court's) case law of where bias was and was not
established.
Explain that, in order to ensure fairness for both parties, the
adjudicator may provide some degree of assistance to litigants,
particularly if they are self-represented. It should explain that its
objective is not to help a party succeed, but to ensure that both
parties have access to a fair hearing. Again, the practice direction
could refer to examples from the jurisprudence and explain that
the adjudicator's involvement will be assessed based on whether
it gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
To the extent that the tribunal uses active adjudication, the practice
direction should explain that using this model of adjudication does
not necessarily lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias, although
the adjudicator's comments and behaviour will be assessed on the
basis of whether they reasonably gave rise to an apprehension of
bias.

Conclusion
The increasing presence of self-represented litigants and emerging trends
in adjudicative roles call out for a rethinking of the notion of impartiality.
The role of the adjudicator and the principles that define that role must be
alive to the needs and reality of increasing numbers of self-represented
litigants. If, as the courts have held, it is unfair to expect self-represented
litigants to navigate legal processes without assistance and direction, it is
also unfair to adopt on a vision of impartiality that prevents adjudicators
from providing that help and direction.

88. Some have suggested that this approach should be rethought and that, in some circumstances, it
is appropriate to refer allegations of bias to another adjudicator for decision. For a critical discussion
of this issue see Hammond, supra note 84 at 82-84.
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Increasingly, a contextual and "substantive" approach to impartiality
is emerging from the jurisprudence. Impartiality is no longer about treating
all parties with the same neutral passivity. Instead it is about fairness and
the needs of the particular litigants-we now recognize that adjudicators
are not biased simply because they provide self-represented litigants with
the assistance and direction they need to present their case to the best of
their ability.89 While this is an important shift, it comes with challenges
of its own. In particular, although the jurisprudence tells us that some
measure of assistance and direction is generally deemed to be appropriate, 90
it can be difficult to assess just how much direction or assistance is too
much. Determining what creates a reasonable apprehension of bias is a
challenging issue for jurists and courts, especially as they grapple with
emerging trends in adjudication. The issue can be especially difficult for
self-represented litigants.
While there are no bright lines that delineate impermissible adjudicative
conduct, some broad principles have emerged from the jurisprudence.
Many of these principles are nuanced and others are still in the process
of unfolding. It is important to help self-represented litigants understand
at least the basic principles that govern adjudicative behaviour and the
obligation to remain impartial. Educating self-represented litigants about
bias may not only reduce the number of frivolous bias motions and the
resulting delays and waste of adjudicative resources, it may also improve
litigants' confidence in the administrative justice system. Informing
litigants of the process for raising bias and explaining some ofthe applicable
principles may enhance their confidence in the process and the sense that
they have been treated fairly. To this end, administrative tribunals should
consider preparing practice directions, rules, or information points about
impartiality, which address the process and timing for raising allegations
of bias, and provide examples from the jurisprudence to illustrate some of
the basic principles.

89. Flaherty, supra note 3 at 329.
90. Freya Kristjanson & Sharon Naipaul, "Active Adjudication or Entering the Arena: How Much is
Too Much?" (2011) 24 Can J Admin L & Prac 201.

